


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11 March 1963

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*ED. 9*



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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11 March 1963


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
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USSR: Khrushchev has re-defined the party's line on de-Stalinization and on liberalization in the arts, reversing his attitude of last November in both cases.

In a 9 March speech to representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, Khrushchev called for a de-emphasis in literature of personal suffering under Stalin, reaffirmed Stalin's contributions to the Communist movement as well as his abuses of power, and for the first time publicly defended his own actions during the Stalin years. His claim that he personally averted various miscarriages of justice in the years preceding Stalin's death was probably prompted by a recent debate among Soviet intellectuals regarding the guilt of those who made their careers during the years of Stalin's "lawlessness."

Khrushchev strongly reaffirmed his intent to control both the form and content of Soviet art and literature and harshly condemned "formalist and abstractionist trends," warning that supporters of such bourgeois influences might attack the socialist system itself.

The meeting with the intelligentsia--the second in three months at which Khrushchev was present--was attended by most Soviet leaders and by party bosses from all the republics of the USSR. The latter were probably called to Moscow to hear the new de-Stalinization and cultural lines and may have been briefed on other policy problems as well.



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Sino-Soviet Relations: Letters have been exchanged between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties affirming the "necessity" of holding bilateral talks on "important" questions, but such talks, if held, are unlikely to result in a settlement of the differences between the two parties.

(The Soviet letter probably was presented to Mao Tse-tung on 23 February when he met with Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko. The Burmese ambassador in Moscow recently told a US Embassy official that he had heard that that meeting was "very unpleasant" for Chervonenko.) Since then Peiping has renewed its bitter assault on the Soviet position and reiterated its own uncompromising stand on the questions at issue.

Moscow has not yet made a direct response to the renewed Chinese attacks. A Pravda article of 6 March indirectly attacked Peiping by historical analogy. The article, in commemoration of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet Communist Party's 7th extraordinary congress in 1918, cited Lenin's defense of the Brest-Litovsk "compromise" against his "left-Communist" critics. The article was obviously intended as a defense of Khrushchev's foreign policy, notably regarding Cuba.

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Afghanistan: The official announcement on 9 March of Prime Minister Daud's resignation marks the end of almost ten years of near-dictatorial control.

Prince Daud's successor, former Minister of Mines and Industries Mohammed Yusuf, has no political power in his own right. He is an experienced administrator whose responsibilities have included a number of Soviet-assisted development projects. King Zahir Shah reportedly has given him an interim appointment for the delicate transitional period while a more permanent government is being formed.

If the King remains in firm control, the government is likely to adopt a more cautious attitude toward the USSR. Zahir may try gradually to restore Afghanistan's foreign relations to a more balanced neutral position by moderating somewhat its pro-Soviet attitude of recent years. At the same time, Zahir will probably continue to cultivate good relations with the USSR and seek to retain Soviet developmental assistance.

With Daud no longer in control, the new government will probably be less adamant in the Pushtoonistan dispute with Pakistan. Zahir apparently wants to reopen the Pakistan border to transit trade in order to restore the traditional access route to Free-World markets. Pakistan would nevertheless put Zahir in a difficult position if it propagandizes Daud's resignation as the direct result of Ayub's tough policy toward Daud.

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[REDACTED]



Somalia-UK: \*Somali Prime Minister Abdirascid announced on 11 March that his government had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Britain.

Relations between Britain and the Somali Republic deteriorated over the issue of Mogadiscio's claims to the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.

Britain's announcement on 8 March that Nairobi would continue to administer the district under a plan of regional autonomy touched off anti-British demonstrations in Mogadiscio. A British announcement of an alert for its forces in Kenya has been followed by the declaration of an alert for the Somali army.

The Abdirascid government is reported to have formally asked for Soviet, Chinese Communist, and Czechoslovakian support of its claims. This request was made in response to the demands of a group of parliamentary deputies that the Bloc be asked to demonstrate its friendship.

(Britain now has assured Somalia that before granting Kenya full independence it plans to consult Somalia regarding the ultimate disposition of the disputed territory.)

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South Vietnam: (The anti-American feelings of Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's brother and chief political adviser, appear to be sharpening.)

(Nhu is reported to have stated recently that South Vietnam's army has come increasingly under the influence of American advisers and is carrying out primarily American policy.)

[REDACTED]  
the large number of Americans in South Vietnam and the country's dependence on American aid provided the Communists a propaganda advantage, and that all Americans not absolutely essential should be withdrawn.)

(Nhu has frequently instigated the government's sharp rejoinders to criticism, particularly from the American press. He, and possibly Diem as well, still suspect that Americans were involved in the 1960 coup attempt and the 1962 palace bombing, and that an American-influenced army may again attempt to oust the present regime.)

(Nhu is said to feel that the Diem government should base its strength on strategic hamlets and on irregular forces--such as the armed Republican Youth which Nhu heads--rather than on the army.

[REDACTED] he is promoting policies designed to assure himself an eventual position of dominance.) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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West Germany: Bonn now strongly favors nuclear submarines rather than surface ships for the proposed NATO multilateral force.

Defense Minister von Hassel told Ambassador Merchant on 8 March that preliminary studies indicate that the difference in costs between submarines and surface craft is not as great as first anticipated. While acknowledging that establishment of a submarine force would take longer, von Hassel emphasized that the overriding consideration for Bonn was the political difficulty the government would face in trying to persuade the Bundestag and the public to accept surface ships when submarines are militarily preferable.

Von Hassel admitted that if it were agreed to use submarines American atomic energy laws would pose difficult problems, but he felt that these problems would not prove insurmountable.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NOTES

Iran: The resignation of Minister of Agriculture Hassan Arsanjani has removed a potentially troublesome figure from the cabinet but also will probably cause Iran's revolutionary land reform program to lose much of its momentum. Arsanjani was the prime mover in the program and undoubtedly aspired to become prime minister with peasant support. The Shah may have become concerned over Arsanjani's political ambitions and forced his resignation. Arsanjani may now seek other means to mobilize peasant support prior to the elections which have been promised by June or July. [REDACTED]

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Norway: (Norwegian leaders have apparently decided against Norway's participation in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. A Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy officer that his ministry is opposed to participation and that he had little doubt this will be the government position. He also asserted that Norway will not attempt to discourage other NATO members from joining but added that he thought Denmark's position would be similar to Norway's.) [REDACTED]

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\*Iraq: An acceptable framework for settlement of the Kurdish revolt was agreed upon by Kurdish and Iraqi officials on 8 March. Under the terms of the agreement, the Kurds will be allowed to conduct many of their own affairs under a "decentralized government." A number of important problems of security, boundaries, and administration of the Kurdish area remain to be worked out, and these could delay a final settlement.

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